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I. ABSTRACT
A class of conserved models of wealth distributions are
studied where wealth (or money) is assumed to be ex-
changed between a pair of agents in a population just
like the elastically colliding molecules of a gas exchang-
ing energy. All sorts of distributions from exponential
(Boltzmann-Gibbs) to something like Gamma distribu-
tions and to that of Pareto’s law (power law) are obtained
out of such models with simple algorithmic exchange pro-
cesses. Numerical investigations, analysis through tran-
sition matrix and a mean field approach are employed to
understand the generative mechanisms. A general sce-
nario is examined wherefrom a power law and other dis-
tributions can emerge.
II. INTRODUCTION
Wealth is accumulated in various forms and factors.
The continual exchange of wealth (a value assigned)
among the agents in an economy gives rise to interest-
ing and many often universal statistical distributions of
individual wealth. Here the word ‘wealth’ is used in a
general sense for the purpose and the spirit of the re-
view (inspite of separate meanings attached to the terms
‘money’, ‘wealth’ and ‘income’). Econophysics of wealth
distributions [1] is an emerging area where mainly the
ideas and techniques of statistical physics are used in in-
terpreting real economic data of wealth (available mostly
in terms of income) of all kinds of people or other en-
tities (e.g., companies) for that matter, pertaining to
different societies and nations. Literature in this area
is growing steadily (see an excellent website [2]). The
prevalence of income data and apparent interconnections
of many socio-economic problems with physics have in-
spired a wide variety of statistical models, data analy-
sis and other works in econophysics [3], sociophysics and
other emerging areas [4] in the last one decade or more
(see an enjoyable article by Stauffer [5]).
Simple approach of agent based models have been able
to bring out all kinds of wealth distributions that open
up a whole new way of understanding and interpreting
empirical data. One of the most important and contro-
versial issues has been to understand the emergence of
Pareto’s law:
P (w) ∝ w−α, (1)
where w ≥ w0, w0 being some value of wealth beyond
which the power law is observed (usually towards the
tail of the distributions). Pareto’s law has been observed
in income distributions among the people of almost all
kinds of social systems across the world in a robust way.
This phenomenon is now known for more than a century
and has been discussed at a great length in innumer-
able works in economics, econophysics, sociophysics and
physics dealing with power law distributions. In many
places, while mentioning Pareto’s law, the power law is
often written in the form: P (w) ∝ w−(1+ν), where ν is
referred to as ‘Pareto index’. This index is usually found
between 1 and 2 from empirical data fitting. Power laws
in distributions appear in many other cases [6, 7, 8] like
that of computer file sizes, the growth of sizes of business
firms and cities etc. Distributions are often referred to as
‘heavy tailed’ or ‘fat tailed’ distributions [9]. Smaller the
value of α, fatter the tail of the distribution as it may eas-
ily be understood (the distribution is more spread out).
Some early attempts [10] have been made to under-
stand the income distributions which follow Pareto’s law
at the tail of the distributions. Some of them are stochas-
tic logistic equations or some related generalized versions
of that which have been able to generate power laws.
However, the absence of direct interactions of one agent
with any other often carries less significance in terms of
interpreting real data.
Some part of this review is centered around the concept
of emergence of Pareto’s law in the wealth distributions,
especially in the context of the models that are discussed
here. However, a word of caution is in order. In the cur-
rent literature and as well as in the historical occurrences,
the power law distribution has often been disputed with
a closely related lognormal distribution [6]. It is often
not easy to distinguish between the two. Thus a brief
discussion is made here on this issue. Let us consider the
probability density function of a lognormal distribution:
p(w) =
1√
2πσw
exp[−(lnw − w)2/2σ2], (2)
The logarithm of the above can be written as:
ln p(w) = − lnw − ln
√
2πσ − (lnw − w)
2
2σ2
. (3)
If now the variance σ2 in the lognormal distribution is
large enough, the last term on the right hand side can
be very small so that the distribution may appear linear
2on a log-log plot. Thus the cause of concern remains,
particularly when one deals with real data.
In the literature, sometimes one calculates a cumula-
tive distribution function (to show the power law in a
more convincing way) instead of plotting ordinary distri-
bution from simple histogram (probability density func-
tion). The cumulative probability distribution function
P (≥ w) is such that the argument has a value greater
than or equal to w:
P (≥ w) =
∫
∞
w
P (w′)dw′. (4)
If the distribution of data follows a power law P (w) =
Cw−α, then
P (≥ w) = C
∫
∞
w
w′
−α
dw′ =
C
α− 1w
−(α−1). (5)
When the ordinary distribution (found from just his-
togram and binning) is a power law, the cumulative dis-
tribution thus also follows a power law with the exponent
1 less: α − 1, which can be seen from a log-log plot of
data. An extensive discussion on power laws and related
matters can be found in [7].
Besides power laws, a wide variety of wealth distri-
butions from exponential to something like Gamma dis-
tributions are all reported in recent literature in econo-
physics. Exchange of wealth is considered to be a pri-
mary mechanism behind all such distributions. In a
class of wealth exchange models [11, 12, 13, 14] that fol-
low, the economic activities among agents have been as-
sumed to be analogous to random elastic collisions among
molecules as considered in kinetic gas theory in statisti-
cal physics. Analogy is drawn between wealth (w) and
Energy (E), where the average individual wealth (w) at
equilibrium is equivalent to temperature (T ). Wealth
(w) is assumed to be exchanged between two randomly
selected economic agents like the exchange of energy be-
tween a pair of molecules in kinetic gas theory. The in-
teraction is such that one agent wins and the other loses
the same amount so that the sum of their wealth re-
mains constant before and after an interaction (trading):
wi(t+1)+wj(t+1) = wi(t)+wj(t); each trading increases
time t by one unit. Therefore, it is basically a process
of zero sum exchange between a pair of agents; amount
won by one agent is equal to the amount lost by another.
This way wealth is assumed to be redistributed among
a fixed number of agents (N) and the local conservation
ensures the total wealth (W =
∑
wi) of all the agents to
remain conserved.
Random exchange of wealth between a randomly se-
lected pair of agents may be viewed as a gambling pro-
cess (with zero sum exchange) which leads to Boltzmann-
Gibbs type exponential distribution in individual wealth
(P (w) ∝ exp(−w/w). However, a little variation in the
mode of wealth exchange can lead to a distribution dis-
tinctly different from exponential. A number of agent
based conserved models [12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21],
invoked in recent times, are essentially variants of a gam-
bling process. A wide variety of distributions evolve out
of these models. There has been a renewed interest in
such two-agent exchange models in the present scenario
while dealing with various problems in social systems
involving complex interactions. A good insight can be
drawn by looking at the 2× 2 transition matrices associ-
ated with the process of wealth exchange [22].
In this review, the aim would be to arrive at some un-
derstanding of how wealth exchange processes in a sim-
ple working way may lead to a variety of distributions
within the framework of the conserved models A fixed
number of N agents in a system are allowed to interact
(trade) stochastically and thus wealth is exchanged be-
tween them. The basic steps of such a wealth exchange
model are as follows:
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + ∆w, (6)
wj(t+ 1) = wj(t)−∆w,
where wi(t) and wj(t) are wealths of i-th and j-th agents
at time t and wi(t+1) and wj(t+1) are that at the next
time step (t+1). The amount ∆w (to be won or to be lost
by an agent) is determined by the nature of interaction.
If the agents are allowed to interact for a long enough
time, a steady state equilibrium distribution for individ-
ual wealth is achieved. The equilibrium distribution does
not depend on the initial configuration (initial distribu-
tion of wealth among the agents). A single interaction
between a randomly chosen pair of agents is referred here
as one ‘time step’. In some simulations, N such interac-
tions are considered as one time step. This, however,
does not matter as long as the system is evolved through
enough time steps to come to a steady state and then
data is collected for making equilibrium probability dis-
tributions. For all the numerical results presented here,
data have been produced following the available mod-
els, conjectures and conclusions. Systems of N = 1000
agents have been considered in each case. In each numer-
ical investigation, the system is allowed to equilibrate for
a sufficient time that ranges between 105 to 108 time
steps. Configuration averaging has been done over 103
to 105 initial configurations in most cases. The average
wealth (averaged over the agents) is kept fixed at w = 1
(by taking total wealth, W = N) for all the cases. The
wealth distributions, that are dealt here in this review,
are ordinary distributions (probability density function)
and not the cumulative ones.
III. PURE GAMBLING
In a pure gambling process (usual kinetic gas theory),
entire sum of wealths of two agents is up for gambling.
Some random fraction of this sum is shared by one agent
and the rest goes to the other. The randomness or
3stochasticity is introduced into the model through a pa-
rameter ǫ which is a random number drawn from a uni-
form distribution in [0, 1]. (Note that ǫ is independent
of a pair of agents i.e., a pair of agents is not likely to
share the same fraction of aggregate wealth the same way
when they interact repeatedly). The interaction can be
seen through:
wi(t+ 1) = ǫ[wi(t) + wj(t)], (7)
wj(t+ 1) = (1− ǫ)[wi(t) + wj(t)],
where the pair of agents (indicated by i and j) are cho-
sen randomly. The amount of wealth that is exchanged
is ∆w = ǫ[wi(t) + wj(t)] − wi(t). The individual wealth
distribution (P (w) vs. w) at equilibrium emerges out to
be Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution like exponential. Expo-
nential distribution of personal income has in fact been
shown to appear in real data [13, 14]. In the kinetic
theory model, the exponential distribution is found by
standard formulation of master equation or by entropy
maximization method, the latter has been discussed later
in brief in section VIII. A normalized exponential distri-
bution obtained numerically out of this pure gambling
process is shown in Fig. 1 in semi logarithmic plot. The
high end of the distribution appears noisy due to sam-
pling of data. The successive bins on the right hand side
of the graph contain less and less number of samples in
them so the fractional counts in them are seen to fluctu-
ate more (finite size effect). One way to get rid of this
sampling error in a great extent is by way of taking log-
arithmic binning [7]. Here it is not important to do so
as the idea is to show the nature of the curve only. (In
the case of power law distribution, an even better way
to demonstrate and extract the power law exponent is to
plot the cumulative distribution as discussed already.)
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FIG. 1: Distribution of wealth for the case of Pure Gambling:
the linearity in the semi-log plot indicates exponential distri-
bution.
If one intends to take time average of wealth of a sin-
gle agent over a sufficient time, it comes out to be equal
for all the agents. Therefore, the distribution of individ-
ual time averaged wealth turns out to be a delta function
which is checked from numerical data. This is because
the fluctuation of wealth of any agent over time is sta-
tistically no different from that of any other. The same
is true in case of the distribution of wealth of a single
agent over time. However, when the average of wealth of
any agent is calculated over a short time period, the delta
function broadens and the right end part of which decays
exponentially. The distribution of individual wealth at a
certain time turns out to be purely exponential as men-
tioned earlier. This may be thought of as a ‘snap shot’
distribution.
IV. UNIFORM SAVING PROPENSITY
Instead of random sharing of their aggregate wealth
during each interaction, if the agents decide to save (keep
aside) a uniform (and fixed) fraction (λ) of their current
individual wealth, then the wealth exchange equations
look like the following:
wi(t+ 1) = λwi(t) + ǫ(1− λ)[wi(t) + wj(t)], (8)
wj(t+ 1) = λwj(t) + (1 − ǫ)(1− λ)[wi(t) + wj(t)],
where the amount of wealth that is exchanged is ∆w =
(ǫ−1)(1−λ)[wi(t)+wj(t)]. The concept of saving as in-
troduced by Chakrabarti and group [12] in an otherwise
gambling kind of interactions brings out distinctly differ-
ent distributions. A number of numerical works followed
[23, 24, 25] in order to understand the emerging distri-
butions to some extent. Saving induces accumulation of
wealth. Therefore, it is expected that the probability of
finding agents with zero wealth may be zero unlike in
the previous case of pure gambling where due to the un-
guarded nature of exchange many agents are likely to go
nearly bankrupt! (It is to be noted that for an exponen-
tial distribution, the peak is at zero.) In this case the
most probable value of the distribution (peak) is some-
where else than at zero (the distribution is right skewed).
The right end, however, decays exponentially for large
values of w. It has been claimed through heuristic argu-
ments (based on numerical results) that the distribution
is a close approximate form of the Gamma distribution
[23]:
P (w) =
nn
Γ(n)
wn−1e−nw, (9)
where the Gamma function Γ(n) and the index n are un-
derstood to be related to the saving propensity parameter
λ through the following relation:
n = 1+
3λ
1− λ. (10)
The emergence of probable Gamma distribution is also
subsequently supported through numerical results in [24].
4However, it has later been shown in [26] by considering
moments’ equation that moments up to third order agree
with that obtained from the above form of distribution
subject to the condition stated in eqn. (10). Discrepan-
cies start showing only from 4th order onwards. There-
fore, the actual form of distribution still remains an open
question.
In Fig. 2, two distributions are shown for two different
values of saving propensity factor: λ = 0.4 and λ = 0.8.
Smaller the value of λ, lesser the amount one is able to
save. This in turn means more wealth is available in the
market for gambling. In the limit of zero saving (λ = 0)
the model reduces to that of pure gambling. In the oppo-
site extent of large saving, only a small amount of wealth
is up for gambling. Then the exchange of wealth will not
be able to drastically change the amount of individual
wealth. This means the width of distribution of individ-
ual wealth will be narrow. In the limit of λ = 1, all the
agents save all of their wealth and thus the distribution
never evolves. The concept of ‘saving’ here is of course
a little different from that in real life where people do
save some amount to be kept in a bank or so and the in-
vestment (or business or gambling) is done generally not
with the entire amount (or a fraction) of wealth that one
holds at a time.
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FIG. 2: Wealth distribution for the model of uniform and
fixed saving propensity. Two distributions are shown with
λ = 0.4 and λ = 0.8 where the stochasticity parameter ǫ is
drawn randomly and uniformly in [0, 1]. Another distribution
is plotted with λ = 0.8 but with fixed value of the stochasticity
parameter, ǫ = 1.
Stochastic evolution of individual wealth is also exam-
ined without the inclusion of stochastic parameter ǫ. The
stochasticity seems to be automatically introduced any-
how through the random selection of a pair of agents (and
the random choice of the winner or loser as well) at each
time. Therefore, it is interesting to see how the distribu-
tions evolve with a fixed value of ǫ. As an example, the
equations in (8) reduce to the following with ǫ = 1:
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + (1 − λ)wj(t), (11)
wj(t+ 1) = λwj(t).
The above equations indicate that the randomly selected
agent j keeps (saves) an amount λwj(t) which is propor-
tional to the wealth he currently has and transfers the
rest to the other agent i. This is indeed a stochastic pro-
cess and is able to produce Gamma type distributions in
wealth as observed. However, a distribution with ran-
dom ǫ and that with a fixed ǫ are different. Numerically,
it has been observed, the distribution with λ = 0.8 and
with ǫ = 1 is very close to that with λ = 0.5 and with
random ǫ. In Fig. 2 the distribution with fixed λ = 0.8
and fixed ǫ = 1 is plotted along with other two distribu-
tions with random ǫ. It should also be noted that while
with fixed ǫ, one does not get Gamma type distributions
for all values of λ; especially for low values of λ the dis-
tributions become close to exponential as observed. This
is not clearly understood though.
It has recently been brought to notice in [27] that a
very similar kind of agent based model was proposed by
Angle [28] (see other references cited in [27]) in sociolog-
ical journals quite some years ago. The pair of equations
in Angle’s model are as follows:
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) +Dtωwj(t)− (1 −Dt)ωwi(t), (12)
wj(t+ 1) = wj(t) + (1−Dt)ωwi(t)−Dtωwj(t),
where ω is a fixed fraction and the winner is decided
through a random toss Dt which takes a value either 0 or
1. Now, the above can be seen as the more formal way of
writing the pair of equations (11) which can be arrived
at by choosing Dt = 1 and identifying ω = (1− λ).
It can in general be said, within the framework of this
kind of (conserved) models, different ways of incorpo-
rating wealth exchange processes may lead to drastically
different distributions. If the gamble is played in a biased
way, then this may lead to a distinctly different situation
than the case when it is played in a normal unbiased
manner. Since in this class of models negative wealth or
debt is not allowed, it is desirable that in each wealth ex-
change, the maximum that any agent may invest is the
amount that he has at that time. Suppose, the norm
is set for an ‘equal amount invest’ where the amount to
be deposited by an agent for gambling is decided by the
amount the poorer agent can afford and consequently
the same amount is agreed to be deposited by the richer
agent. Let us suppose wi > wj . Now, the poorer agent
(j) may invest a certain fraction of his wealth, an amount
λwj and the rest (1−λ)wj is saved by him. Then the total
amount 2λwj is up for gambling and as usual a fraction of
this, 2ǫλwj may be shared by the richer agent i where the
rest (1− ǫ)λwj goes to the poorer agent j. This may ap-
pear fine, however, this leads to ‘rich gets richer and poor
gets poorer’ way. The richer agent draws more and more
wealth in his favour in the successive encounters and the
poorer agents are only able to save less and less and fi-
nally there is a condensation of wealth at the hands of the
5richest person. This is more apparent when one considers
an agent with λ = 1 where it can be easily checked that
the richer agent automatically saves an amount equal to
the difference of their wealth (wi − wj) and the poorer
agent ends up saving zero amount. Eventually, poorer
agents get extinct. This is ‘minimum exchange model’
[21].
V. DISTRIBUTED SAVING PROPENSITY
The distributions emerge out to be dramatically differ-
ent when the saving propensity factor (λ) is drawn from a
uniform and random distribution in [0,1] as introduced in
a model proposed by Chatterjee, Chakrabarti and Manna
[15]. Randomness in λ is assumed to be quenched (i.e.,
remains unaltered in time). Agents are indeed heteroge-
neous. They are likely to have different (characteristic)
saving propensities. The pair of wealth exchange equa-
tions are now written as:
wi(t+1) = λiwi(t)+ǫ[(1−λi)wi(t)+(1−λj)wj(t))], (13)
wj(t+1) = λjwj(t)+(1−ǫ)[(1−λi)wi(t)+(1−λj)wj(t))].
A power law with exponent α = 2 (Pareto index ν = 1)
is observed at the right end of the wealth distribution for
several decades. Such a distribution is plotted in Fig. 3
where a straight line is drawn in the log-log plot with
slope = -2 to illustrate the power law and the exponent.
Extensive numerical results with different distributions in
the saving propensity parameter λ are reported in [18].
Power law (with exponent α = 2) is found to be ro-
bust. The value of Pareto index obtained here (ν = 1),
however, differs from what is generally extracted (1.5 or
above) from most of the empirical data of income dis-
tributions (see discussions and analysis on real data by
various authors in [1]). The present model is not able
to resolve this discrepancy and it is not expected at the
outset either. introducing random waiting time in the
interactions of agents in order to have a justification for
a larger value of the exponent ν [29].
The distributed saving gives rise to an additional inter-
esting feature when a special case is considered where the
saving parameter λ is assumed to have only two fixed val-
ues, λ1 and λ2 (preferably widely separated). A bimodal
distribution in individual wealth results in [22]. This can
be seen from the Fig. 4. The system evolves towards a
robust and distinct two-peak distribution as the differ-
ence in λ1 and λ2 is increased systematically. Later it is
seen that one still gets a two-peak distribution even when
λ1 and λ2 are drawn from narrow distributions centered
around two widely separated values (one large and one
small). Two economic classes seem to persist until the
distributions in λ1 and λ2 have got sufficient widths. A
population can be imagined to have two distinctly differ-
ent kinds of people: some of them tend to save a very
large fraction (fixed) of their wealth and the others tend
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FIG. 3: Wealth distribution for the model of random saving
propensity plotted in log-log scale. A straight line with slope
= -2 is drawn to demonstrate that the power law exponent is
α = 2.
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FIG. 4: Bimodal distribution of wealth (w) with fixed values
of saving propensities, λ1=0.2 and λ2=0.8. Emergence of two
economic classes are apparent.
to save a relatively small fraction (fixed) of their wealth.
Bimodal distributions (and a polymodal distribution, in
general) are, in fact, reported with real data for the in-
come distributions in Argentina [30]. The distributions
were derived at a time of political crisis and thus they
may not be regarded as truly equilibrium distributions
though. However, it remains an interesting possibility
out of a simple model of wealth exchange.
A. Power law from mean field analysis
One can have an estimate of ensemble averaged value
of wealth [31] using one of the above equations (13) in
section V. Emergence of a power law in the wealth distri-
bution can be established through a simple consideration
as follows. Taking ensemble average of all the terms on
6both sides of the first eqn. (13), one may write:
〈wi〉 = λi〈wi〉+〈ǫ〉[(1−λi)〈wi〉+〈 1
N
N∑
j=1
(1−λj)wj〉] (14)
The last term on the right hand side is replaced by the
average over agents where it is assumed that any agent
(here the i-th agent), on an average, interacts with all
other agents of the system, allowing sufficient time to
interact. This is basically a mean field approach. If ǫ
is assumed to be distributed randomly and uniformly
between 0 and 1 then 〈ǫ〉 = 12 . Wealth of each indi-
vidual keeps on changing due to interactions (or wealth
exchange processes that take place in a society). No mat-
ter what the personal wealth one begins with, the time
evolution of wealth of an individual agent at the steady
state is independent of that initial value. This means
the distribution of wealth of a single agent over time is
stationary. Therefore, the time averaged value of wealth
of any agent remains unchanged whatever the amount
of wealth one starts with. In course of time, an agent
interacts with all other agents (presumably repeatedly)
given sufficient time. One can thus think of a number
of ensembles (configurations) and focus attention on a
particular tagged agent who eventually tends to interact
with all other agents in different ensembles. Thus the
time averaged value of wealth is equal to the ensemble
averaged value in the steady state.
Now if one writes
〈(1 − λ)w〉 ≡ 〈 1
N
N∑
j=1
(1− λj)wj〉, (15)
the above equation (14) reduces to:
(1 − λi)〈wi〉 = 〈(1 − λ)w〉), (16)
The right hand side of the above equation is independent
of any agent-index and the left hand side is referred to
any arbitrarily chosen agent i. Thus, it can be argued
that the above relation can be true for any agent (for
any value of the index i) and so it can be equated to a
constant. Let us now recognize C = 〈(1− λ)w〉, a con-
stant which is found by averaging over all the agents in
the system and which is further averaged over ensembles.
Therefore, one arrives at a unique relation for this model:
w =
C
(1− λ) , (17)
where one can get rid of the index i and may write
〈wi〉 = w for brevity. The above relation is also veri-
fied numerically which is obtained by many authors in
their numerical simulations and scaling of data [18, 24].
One can now derive dw = w
2
C dλ from the above relation
(17). An agent with a (characteristic) saving propensity
factor (λ) ends up with wealth (w) such that one can in
general relate the distributions of the two:
P (w)dw = g(λ)dλ. (18)
If now the distribution in λ is considered to be uniform
then g(λ) = constant. Therefore, the distribution in w is
bound to be of the form:
p(w) ∝ 1
w2
. (19)
This may be regarded as Pareto’s law with index α =
2 which is already numerically verified for this present
model. The same result is also obtained recently in [32]
where the treatment is argued to be exact.
B. Power law from reduced situation
From numerical investigations, it seems that the
stochasticity parameter ǫ is irrelevant as long as the sav-
ing propensity parameter λ is made random. It has been
tested that the model is still able to produce power law
(with the same exponent, α = 2) for any fixed value of ǫ.
As an example, the case for ǫ = 1 is considered. The pair
of wealth exchange equations (refakg:eqn:ransave) now
reduce to the following:
wi(t+1) = wi(t)+(1−λj)wj(t) = wi(t)+ηjwj(t), (20)
wj(t+ 1) = wj(t)− (1 − λj)wj(t) = (1− ηj)wj(t).
The exchange amount, ∆w = (1 − λj)wj(t) = ηjwj(t) is
now regulated by the parameter η = (1− λ) only. If λ is
drawn from a uniform and random distribution in [0, 1],
then η is also uniformly and randomly distributed in [0,
1]. To achieve a power law in the wealth distribution it
seems essential that randomness in η has to be quenched.
For ‘annealed’ type disorder (i.e., when the distribution
in η varies with time) the power law gets washed away
(which is observed through numerical simulations). It
has also been observed that power law can be obtained
when η is uniformly distributed between 0 and some value
less than or equal to 1. As an example, η is taken in the
range between 0 and 0.5, a power law is obtained with
the exponent around α = 2. However, when η is taken in
the range 0.5 < η < 1, the distribution clearly deviates
from power law which is evident from the log-log plot in
Fig. 5. Thus there seems to be a crossover from power
law to some distribution with exponentially decaying tail
as one tunes the range in the quenched parameter η.
At this point, two important criteria may be identified
for achieving power law within this reduced situation:
• The disorder in the controlling parameter η has to
be quenched (fixed set of η’s for a configuration of
agents),
• It is required that η, when drawn from a uniform
distribution, the lower bound of that should be 0.
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FIG. 5: Wealth distributions (plotted in the log-log scale)
for two cases of the ‘reduced situation’: (i) 0 < η < 0.5
and (ii) 0.5 < η < 1 plotted in log-log scale. In one case,
the distribution follows a power law (with exponent around
α = 2) and in the other case, it is seen to be clearly deviating
from a power law.
The above criteria may appear ad hoc, nevertheless have
been checked by extensive numerical investigations. It
is further checked that the power law exponent does not
depend on the width of the distribution in η (as long as
it is between 0 and something less than 1). This claim
is substantiated by taking various ranges of η in which
it is uniformly distributed. Systematic investigations are
made for the cases where η is drawn in [0, 0.2], [0, 0.4],
. . . ,[0, 1]. Power laws result in in all the cases with the
exponent around α = 2.
VI. UNDERSTANDING THROUGH
TRANSITION MATRIX
The evolution of wealth in the kind of two-agent wealth
exchange process can be described through the following
2× 2 transition matrix (T ) [22]:
(
w′i
w′j
)
= T
(
wi
wj
)
,
where it is written, w′i ≡ wi(t + 1) and wi ≡ wi(t) and
so on. The transition matrix (T ) corresponding to pure
gambling process (in section III) can be written as:
T =
(
ǫ ǫ
1− ǫ 1− ǫ
)
.
In this case the above matrix is singular (determinant,
|T | = 0) which means the inverse of this matrix does not
exit. This in turn indicates that an evolution through
such transition matrices is bound to be irreversible. This
property is connected to the emergence of exponential
(Boltzmann-Gibbs) wealth distribution. The same may
be perceived in a different way too. When a product of
such matrices (for successive interactions) are taken, the
left most matrix (of the product) itself returns:
(
ǫ ǫ
1− ǫ 1− ǫ
)(
ǫ1 ǫ1
1− ǫ1 1− ǫ1
)
=
(
ǫ ǫ
1− ǫ 1− ǫ
)
.
The above signifies the fact that during the repeated
interactions of the same two agents (via this kind
of transition matrices), the last of the interactions is
what matters (the last matrix of the product survives)
[T (n).T (n−1) . . . T (2).T (1) = T (n)]. This ‘loss of memory’
(random history of collisions in case of molecules) may
be attributed here to the path to irreversibility in time.
The singularity can be avoided if one considers the
following general form:
T1 =
(
ǫ1 ǫ2
1− ǫ1 1− ǫ2
)
,
where ǫ1 and ǫ2 are two different random numbers drawn
uniformly from [0, 1] (This ensures the transition matrix
to be nonsingular.). The significance of this general form
can be seen through the wealth exchange equations in the
following way: the ǫ1 fraction of wealth of the 1st agent
(i) added with ǫ2 fraction of wealth of the 2nd agent (j)
is retained by the 1st agent after the trade. The rest of
their total wealth is shared by the 2nd agent. This may
happen in a number of ways which can be related to the
detail considerations of a model. The general matrix T1
is nonsingular as long as ǫ1 6= ǫ2 and then the two-agent
interaction process remains reversible in time. Therefore,
it is expected to have a steady state equilibrium distribu-
tion of wealth which may deviate from exponential distri-
bution (as in the case with pure gambling model). When
one considers ǫ1 = ǫ2, one again gets back the pure expo-
nential distribution. A trivial case is obtained for ǫ1 = 1
and ǫ2 = 0. The transition matrix then reduces to the
identity matrix I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
which trivially corresponds
to no interaction and no evolution.
It may be emphasized that any transition matrix(
t11 t12
t21 t22
)
, for such conserved models is bound to be
of the form such that the sum of two elements of either
of the columns has to be unity by design: t11 + t21 = 1,
t12 + t22 = 1. It is important to note that whatever ex-
tra parameter, no matter, one incorporates within the
framework of the conserved model, the transition matrix
has to retain this property.
In Fig. 6 three distributions (with ǫ1 6= ǫ2) are plot-
ted where ǫ1 and ǫ2 are drawn randomly from uniform
distributions with different ranges. It is demonstrated
that qualitatively different distributions are possible as
the parameter ranges are tuned appropriately.
Now let us compare the above situation with the model
of equal saving propensity as discussed in section IV.
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FIG. 6: Three normalized wealth distributions are shown cor-
responding to the general matrix T2 (in general with ǫ1 6= ǫ2)
as discussed in the text. Curves are marked by numbers (1, 2
and 3) and the ranges of ǫ1 and ǫ2 are indicated within which
they are drawn uniformly and randomly.
With the incorporation of saving propensity factor λ, the
transition matrix now looks like:
(
λ+ ǫ(1− λ) ǫ(1− λ)
(1− ǫ)(1− λ) λ+ (1− ǫ)(1− λ)
)
.
The matrix elements can now be rescaled by assuming
ǫ˜1 = λ+ ǫ(1− λ) and ǫ˜2 = ǫ(1− λ) in the above matrix.
Therefore, the above transition matrix reduces to
T2 =
(
ǫ˜1 ǫ˜2
1− ǫ˜1 1− ǫ˜2
)
.
Thus the matrix T2 is of the same form as T1. The dis-
tributions due to above two matrices of the same general
form can now be compared if one can correctly identify
the ranges of the rescaled elements. In the model of
uniform saving: λ < ǫ˜1 < 1 and 0 < ǫ˜2 < (1 − λ) as
the stochasticity parameter ǫ is is drawn from a uniform
and random distribution in [0, 1]. As long as ǫ˜1 and ǫ˜2
are different, the determinant of the matrix is nonzero
(|T2| = ǫ˜1 − ǫ˜2 = λ). Therefore, the incorporation of the
saving propensity factor λ brings two effects:
• The transition matrix becomes nonsingular,
• The matrix elements t11 (= ǫ˜1) and t12 (= ǫ˜2) are
now drawn from truncated domains (somewhere in
[0, 1]).
Hence it is clear from the above discussion that the
wealth distribution with uniform saving is likely to be
qualitatively no different from what can be achieved with
general transition matrices having different elements,
ǫ1 6= ǫ2. The distributions obtained with different λ may
correspond to that with appropriately chosen ǫ1 and ǫ2
in T1.
In the next stage, when the saving propensity factor
λ is distributed as in section V, the transition matrix
between any two agents having different λ’s (say, λ1 and
λ2) now looks like:
(
λ1 + ǫ(1− λ1) ǫ(1− λ2)
(1− ǫ)(1− λ1) λ2 + (1− ǫ)(1− λ2)
)
.
Again the elements of the above matrix can be rescaled
by putting ǫ˜′1 = λ1 + ǫ(1−λ1) and ǫ˜′2 = ǫ(1−λ2). Hence
the transition matrix can again be reduced to the same
form as that of T1 or T2:
T3 =
(
ǫ˜′1 ǫ˜
′
2
1− ǫ˜′1 1− ǫ˜′2
)
.
The determinant here is |T3| = ǫ˜′1 − ǫ˜′2 = λ1(1− ǫ) + ǫλ2.
Here also the determinant is ensured to be nonzero as all
the parameters ǫ, λ1 and λ2 are drawn from the same
positive domain: [0, 1]. This means that each transition
matrix for two-agent wealth exchange remains nonsingu-
lar which ensures the interaction process to be reversible
in time. Therefore, it is expected that qualitatively dif-
ferent distributions are possible when one appropriately
tunes the two independent elements in the general form
of transition matrix (T1 or T2 or T3). However, the emer-
gence of power law tail (Pareto’s law) in the distribution
can not be explained by this. Later it is examined that
to obtain a power law in the framework of present mod-
els, it is essential that the distribution in λ has to be
quenched (frozen in time) which means the matrix ele-
ments in the general form of any transition matrix have
to be quenched. In the section VB, it has been shown
that the model of distributed saving (section V) is equiv-
alent to a reduced situation where one needs only one
variable η. The this case the corresponding transition
matrix looks even simpler:
T4 =
(
1 η
0 1− η
)
,
where a nonzero determinant (|T4| = 1−η 6= 0) is ensured
among other things.
A. Distributions from generic situation
From all the previous discussions, it is clear that the
the transition matrix (for zero sum wealth exchange) is
bound to be of the following general form:
(
ǫ1 ǫ2
1− ǫ1 1− ǫ2
)
.
The matrix elements, ǫ1 and ǫ2 can be appropriately as-
sociated with the relevant parameters in a model. A
9generic situation arrives where one can generate all sorts
of distributions by controlling ǫ1 and ǫ2.
As long as ǫ1 6= ǫ2, the matrix remains nonsingular
and one achieves Gamma type distributions. In a spe-
cial case, when ǫ1 = ǫ2, the transition matrix becomes
singular and Boltzmann-Gibbs type exponential distri-
bution results in. It has been numerically checked that a
power law with exponent α = 2 is obtained with the gen-
eral matrix when the elements ǫ1 and ǫ2 are of the same
set of quenched random numbers drawn uniformly in [0,
1]. The matrix corresponding to the reduced situation in
the section VB, as discussed, is just a special case with
ǫ1 = 1 and ǫ2 = η, drawn from a uniform and (quenched)
random distribution. Incorporation of any parameter in
an actual model (saving propensity, for example) results
in the adjustment or truncation of the full domain [0, 1]
from which the element ǫ1 or ǫ2 is drawn. Incorporating
distributed λ’s in section V is equivalent to considering
the following domains: λ1 < ǫ1 < 1 and 0 < ǫ2 < (1−λ2).
A more general situation arrives when the matrix ele-
ments ǫ1 and ǫ2 are of two sets of random numbers drawn
separately (one may identify them as ǫ
(1)
1 and ǫ
(2)
2 to dis-
tinguish) from two uniform and random distributions in
the domain: [0, 1]. In this case a power law is obtained
with the exponent α = 3 which is, however, distinctly dif-
ferent from that obtained in ‘distributed saving model’
in section V. To test the robustness of the power law, the
distributions in the matrix elements are taken in the fol-
lowing truncated ranges: 0.5 < ǫ1 < 1 and 0 < ǫ2 < 0.5
(widths are narrowed down). A power law is still ob-
tained with the same exponent (α close to 3). These
results are plotted in Fig. 7.
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FIG. 7: Distribution of individual wealth (w) for the most
general case with random and quenched ǫ1 and ǫ2: The
elements are drawn from two separate distributions where
0 < ǫ1 < 1 and 0 < ǫ2 < 1 in one case and in the other
case, they are chosen from the ranges, 0.5 < ǫ1 < 1 and
0 < ǫ2 < 0.5. Both show power laws with the same expo-
nent around 3.0 (the two distributions almost superpose). A
straight line (with slope -3.0) is drawn to demonstrate the
power law in the log-log scale.
It is possible to achieve distributions other than power
laws as one draws the matrix elements, ǫ1 and ǫ2 from dif-
ferent domains within the range between 0 and 1. There
is indeed a crossover from power law to Gamma like dis-
tributions as one tunes the elements. It appears from ex-
tensive numerical simulations that power law disappears
when both the parameters are drawn from some ranges
that do not include the lower limit 0. For example, when
it is considered, 0.8 < ǫ1 < 1.0 and 0.2 < ǫ2 < 0.4,
the wealth distribution does not follow a power law. In
contrast, when ǫ1 and ǫ2 are drawn from the ranges,
0.8 < ǫ1 < 1.0 and 0 < ǫ2 < 0.1, the power law dis-
tribution is back again.
It now appears that to achieve a power law in such a
generic situation, the following criteria are to be fulfilled:
• It is essential to have the randomness or disorder
in the elements ǫ1 and ǫ2 to be quenched,
• In the most general case, ǫ1 should be drawn from
a uniform distribution whose upper bound has to
be 1 and for ǫ2 the lower bound has to be 0. Then a
power law with higher exponent α = 3 is achieved.
To have a power law with exponent α = 2, the ma-
trix elements are to be drawn from the same dis-
tribution. (These choices automatically make the
transition matrices to be nonsingular.)
The above points are not supported analytically at this
stage. However, the observation seems to bear important
implications in terms of generation of power law distri-
butions.
When the disorder or randomness in the elements ǫ1
and ǫ2 change with time (i.e., not quenched) unlike the
situation just discussed above, the problem is perhaps
similar to the mass diffusion and aggregation model by
Majumdar, Krishnamurthy and Barma [33]. The mass
model is defined on a one dimensional lattice with pe-
riodic boundary condition. A fraction of mass from a
randomly chosen site is assumed to be continually trans-
ported to any of its neighbouring sites at random. The
total mass between the two sites then is unchanged (one
site gains mass and the other loses the same amount) and
thus the total mass of the system remains conserved. The
mass of each site evolves as
mi(t+ 1) = (1− ηi)mi(t) + ηjmj(t). (21)
Here it is assumed that ηi fraction of mass mi is dissoci-
ated from that site i and joins either of its neighbouring
sites j = i ± 1. Thus (1 − ηi) fraction of mass mi re-
mains at that site whereas a fraction ηj of mass mj from
the neighbouring site joins the mass at site i. Now if we
identify ǫ1 = (1− ηi) and ǫ2 = ηj then this model is just
the same as described by the general transition matrix
as discussed so far. If ηi’s are drawn from a random and
uniform distribution in [0, 1] then a mean field calcula-
tion (which turns out to be exact in the thermodynamic
limit), as shown in [33], brings out the stationary mass
distribution P (m) to be a Gamma distribution:
P (m) =
4m
m2
e−2m/m, (22)
10
where m is the average mass of the system. It has been
numerically checked that there seems to be no apprecia-
ble change in the distribution even when the lattice is not
considered. Lattice seems to play no significant role in
the case of kinetic theory like wealth distribution mod-
els as well. Incidentally, this distribution with m = 1 is
exactly the same as the Gamma distribution [eqn. (9)],
mentioned in section IV when one considers n = 2 in
that. The index n equals to 2 when one puts λ = 14 in
the relation (10).
In the general situation (ǫ1 6= ǫ2), when both the pa-
rameters are drawn from a random and uniform distribu-
tion in [0, 1], the emerging distribution very nearly fol-
lows the above expression (22). Only when the random-
ness in them is quenched (fixed in time), there is a pos-
sibility of getting a power law as it is already mentioned.
The Gamma distribution [eqn. (22)] and the numerically
obtained distributions for different cases (as discussed in
the text) are plotted in Fig. 8 in support of the above
discussions.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4
P
ro
b
. 
D
e
n
s
it
y
Wealth or Mass
Gen. case, ε1, ε2
Saving, λ=0.25
Mass model
Gamma Dist.
FIG. 8: Normalized probability distribution functions ob-
tained for three different cases: (i) Wealth distribution with
random and uniform ǫ1 and ǫ2 in [0, 1], (ii) Wealth distri-
bution with uniform and fixed saving propensity, λ = 1
4
, (iii)
Mass distribution for the model [33] in one dimensional lattice
(as discussed in text). The theoretical Gamma distribution
[the eqn. (22)] is also plotted (line draw) to have a comparison.
VII. ROLE OF SELECTIVE INTERACTION
So far the models of wealth exchange processes have
been considered where a pair of agents is selected ran-
domly. However, interactions or trade among agents in
a society are often guided by personal choice or some
social norms or some other reasons. Agents may like to
interact selectively and it would be interesting to see how
the Individual wealth distribution is influenced by selec-
tion [19]. The concept of selective interaction is already
there when one considers the formation of a family. The
members of a same family are unlikely to trade (or inter-
act) among each other. It may be worth to examine the
role played by the concept of ‘family’ in wealth distribu-
tions of families: ‘family wealth distribution’ for brevity.
A family in a society usually consists of more than one
agent. In computer simulation, the agents belonging to a
same family are coloured to keep track of. To find wealth
distributions of families, the contributions of the same
family members are added up. In Fig. 9 family wealth
distributions are plotted for three cases: (i) families con-
sist of 2 members each, (ii) families consist of 4 members
each and (iii) families of mixed sizes between 1 and 4.
The distributions are clearly not pure exponential, but
modified exponential distributions (Gamma type distri-
butions) with different peaks and different widths. This
is quite expected as the probability of zero income of a
family is zero. Modified exponential distribution for fam-
ily wealth is also supported by fitting real data [14].
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FIG. 9: Family wealth distributions: two curves are for fam-
ilies consisting of all equal sizes of 2 and 4. One curve is for
a system of families consisting of various sizes between 1 and
4. The distributions are not normalized.
Some special way of incorporating selective interaction
is seen to have a drastic effect in the individual wealth dis-
tribution. To implement the idea of ‘selection’, a ‘class’
of an agent is defined through an index ǫ. The class may
be understood in terms of some sort of efficiency of accu-
mulating wealth or some other closely related property.
Therefore, ǫ’s are assumed to be quenched. It is assumed
that during the interactions, the agents may convert an
appropriate amount of wealth proportional to their effi-
ciency factor in their favour or against. Now, the model
can be understood in terms of the general form of equa-
tions:
wi(t+ 1) = ǫiwi(t) + ǫjwj(t), (23)
wj(t+ 1) = (1− ǫi)wi(t) + (1− ǫj)wj(t),
where ǫi’s are quenched random numbers between 0 and
1 (randomly assigned to the agents at the beginning).
Now the agents are supposed to make a choice to whom
not to trade with. This option, in fact, is not unnatural
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in the context of a real society where individual or group
opinions are important. There has been a lot of works on
the process and dynamics of opinion formations [4, 34]
in model social systems. In the present model it may be
imagined that the ‘choice’ is simply guided by the rela-
tive class index of the two agents. It is assumed that an
interaction takes place when the ratio of two class fac-
tors remain within certain upper limit. The requirement
for interaction (trade) to happen is then 1 < ǫi/ǫj < τ ,
where ǫi > ǫj. Wealth distributions for various values of
τ are numerically investigated. Power laws in the tails of
the distributions are obtained in all cases. In Fig. 10 the
distributions for τ = 2 and τ = 4 are shown. Power laws
are clearly seen with an exponent, α = 3.5 (a straight line
with slope around -3.5 is drawn) which means the Pareto
index ν is close to 2.5. It is not further investigated
whether the exponent (α) actually differs in a significant
way for different choices of τ . It has been shown that
preferential behaviour [20] generates power law in money
distribution with some imposed conditions which allows
the rich to get higher probability of getting richer. The
rich is also favoured in a model with some kind of asym-
metric exchange rules as proposed in [21] where a power
law results in. The dice seems to be loaded in favour of
the rich otherwise the rich can not be the rich!
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
 0.1  1  10  100
P
(w
)
w (wealth)
Slope=-3.5
FIG. 10: Distribution of individual wealth with selective in-
teraction. Power law is evident in the log-log plot where a
straight line is drawn with slope = -3.5 for comparison.
VIII. MEASURE OF INEQUALITY
Emergence of Pareto’s law signifies the existence of in-
equality in wealth in a population. Inequality or dis-
parity in wealth or that of income is known to exist in
almost all societies. To have a quantitative idea of in-
equality one generally plots Lorenz curve and then cal-
culates Gini coefficient. Here the entropy approach [35] is
considered. The time evolution of an appropriate quan-
tity is examined which may be regarded as a measure of
wealth-inequality.
Let us consider w1, w2, . . . , wN be the wealths of N
agents in a system. LetW =
∑N
i=1 wi be the total wealth
of all the agents. Now pi = wi/W can be considered as
the fraction of wealth the i-th agent shares. Thus each of
pi > 0 and
∑N
i=1 pi = 1. Thus the set of p1, p2, . . . , pN
may be regarded as a probability distribution. The well
known Shannon entropy is defined as the following:
S = −
N∑
i=1
pi ln pi. (24)
From the maximization principle of entropy it can be
easily shown that the entropy (S) is maximum when
p1 = p2 = · · · = pN = 1
N
, (25)
giving the maximum value of S to be lnN where it is
a limit of equality (everyone possesses the same wealth).
A measure of inequality should be something which mea-
sures a deviation from the above ideal situation. Thus
one can have a measure of wealth-inequality to be
H = lnN−S = lnN+
N∑
i=1
pi ln pi =
N∑
i=1
pi ln(Npi). (26)
The greater the value of H , the greater the inequality is.
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FIG. 11: Comparison of time evolution of the measure of
inequality (H) in wealth for different models. Each ‘time
step’ (t) is equal to a single interaction between a pair of
agents. Data is taken after every 104 time steps to avoid
clumsiness and each data point is obtained by averaging over
103 configurations. Y -axis is shown in log-scale to have a fair
comparison.
It is seen that the wealth exchange algorithms are so
designed that the resulting disparity or variance (or mea-
sure of inequality), in effect, increases with time. Wher-
ever power law in distribution results in, the distribu-
tion naturally broadens which indicates that the variance
(σ2) or the inequality measure [H in eqn. (26)] should in-
crease. In the Fig. 11 and in Fig. 12 time evolution of
inequality measure H and variance σ2 respectively are
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FIG. 12: Evolution of variance (σ2) with ‘time’ (t) for dif-
ferent models. Y -axis is shown in log scale to accommodate
three sets of data in a same graph. Data is taken after ev-
ery 104 time steps to avoid clumsiness and each data point is
obtained by averaging over 103 configurations.
plotted with time for three models to have a compar-
ison. It is apparent that the measure of inequality in
steady state attains different levels due to different mech-
anisms of wealth exchange processes, giving rise to dif-
ferent power law exponents. The growth of variance is
seen to be different for different models considered, which
is responsible for power laws with different exponents as
discussed in the text. The power law exponents (α) ap-
pear to be related to the magnitudes of variance that are
attained in equilibrium in the finite systems.
IX. DISTRIBUTION BY MAXIMIZING
INEQUALITY
It is known that probability distribution of wealth of
majority is different from that of handful of minority
(rich people). Disparity is more or less a reality in all
economies. A wealth exchange process can be thought
of within the present framework where the interactions
among agents eventually lead to increasing variance. It is
numerically examined [19] whether the process of forcing
the system to have ever increasing variance (measure of
disparity) leads to a power law as it is known that power
law is usually associated with infinite variance. Evolution
of variance, σ2 = 〈w2〉 − 〈w〉2 is calculated after each in-
teraction in the framework of pure gambling model [the
pair of equations (7)] and it is then forced to increase
monotonically by comparing this to the previously calcu-
lated value (the average value w is fixed by virtue of the
model). This results in a very large variance under this
imposed condition. The inequality factor H also like-
wise increases monotonically and attains a high value. A
power law distribution is obtained with the exponent, α
close to 1. None of the available models does bring out
such a low value of the exponent. The variance in any of
the usual models generally settles at a level much lower
than that is obtained in such a way. The resulting distri-
bution of wealth is plotted in a log-log scale in Fig. 13.
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FIG. 13: Wealth distribution by maximizing the variance in
the pure gambling model. Power law is clearly seen (in the
log-log plot) and a straight line is drawn with slope = -1.1 to
compare.
Power law, however, could not be obtained by the same
way in the case of a non-conserved model like the follow-
ing: wi(t+1) = wi(t)± δ, where the increase or decrease
(δ) in wealth (w) of any agent is independent of any other.
It has also been noted, considering some of the avail-
able models, larger the variance, smaller the exponent
one gets. For example, the variance is seen to attain
higher values (with time) in the model of distributed
(random) saving propensities [18] compared to the model
of selective interaction [19] and the resulting power law
exponent α is close to 2.0 in the former case whereas it
is close to 3.5 in the later. In the present situation the
variance attains even higher values and the exponent α
seems to be close to 1, the lowest among all.
X. CONFUSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
As it is seen, the exchange of wealth in various
modes generates a wide variety of distributions within
the framework of simple wealth exchange models as dis-
cussed. In this review, some basic structures and ideas
of interactions are looked at which seem to be funda-
mental to bring out the desired distributions. In this
kind of agent based models (for some general discussions,
see [36]) the division of labour, demand and supply and
the human qualities (selfish act or altruism) and efforts
(like investments, business) which are essential ingredi-
ents in classical economics are not considered explicitly.
What causes the exchange of wealth of a specific kind
among agents is not important in this discussion. Mod-
els are considered to be conserved (no inflow or outflow
of money/ wealth in or from the system). It is not es-
sential to look for inflation, taxation, debt, investment
returns etc. of and in an economic system at the outset
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for the kind of questions that are addressed here. The
essence of complexities of interactions leading to distri-
butions can be understood in terms of the simple (mi-
croscopic) exchange rules much the same way the simple
logistic equations that went on to construct ‘roads to
Chaos’ and opened up a new horizon of thinking of a
complex phenomenon like turbulence [37].
Some models of zero sum wealth exchange are exam-
ined here in this review. One may start thinking in a
fresh way how the distributions emerge out of the kind
of algorithmic exchange processes that are involved. The
exchange processes can be understood in a general way
by looking at the structure of associated 2 × 2 transi-
tion matrices. Wealths of individuals evolve to have a
specific distribution in a stead state through the kind
of interactions which are basically stochastic in nature.
The distributions shift away from Boltzmann-Gibbs like
exponential to Gamma type distributions and in some
cases distributions emerge with power law tails known
as Pareto’s law (P (w) ∝ w−α). It is also seen that the
wealth distributions seem to be influenced by personal
choice. In a real society, people usually do not inter-
act arbitrarily rather do so with purpose and thinking.
Some kind of personal preference is always there which
may be incorporated in some way or other. Power law
with distinctly different exponent (α = 3.5, Pareto ex-
ponent ν = 2.5) is achieved through a certain way of
selective interaction. The value of Pareto index ν does
not correspond to what is generally obtained empirically.
However, the motivation is not to attach much impor-
tance to the numerical value at the outset rather than
to focus on the fact of how power laws emerge with dis-
tinctly different exponents governed by the simple rules
of wealth exchange.
The fat tailed distributions (power laws) are usually
associated with large variance, which can be a measure
of disparity. Economic disparity usually exists among a
population. The detail mechanism leading to disparity
is not always clear but it can be said to be associated
with the emergence of power law tails in wealth distri-
butions. Monotonically increasing variance (with time)
can be associated with the emergence of power law in in-
dividual wealth distributions. The mean and variance of
a power law distribution can be analytically derived [7]
to see that they are finite when the power law exponent
α is greater than 3. For α ≤ 3, the variance diverges
but then the mean is finite. In case of the models dis-
cussed here in this review, mean is kept fixed but large or
enhanced variance is observed in different models when-
ever there results in a power law. It remains a question
of what can be the mechanisms (in the kind of discrete
and conserved models) that generate large variance and
power law tails. Large and increasing variance is also
associated with lognormal distributions. A simple multi-
plicative stochastic process like w(t+1) = ǫ(t)w(t) can be
used to explain the emergence of lognormal distribution
and indefinite increase in variance. However, empirical
evidence shows that the Pareto index and some other
appropriate indices (Gibrat index, for example), gener-
ally dwindle within some range [38] indicating that the
variance (or any other equivalent measure of inequality)
does not increase forever. It seems to attain a saturation,
given sufficient time. This is indeed the case the numer-
ical results suggest. Normally there occurs simultaneous
increase of variance and mean in statistical systems (in
fact, the relationship between mean and variance goes by
a power law as σ2 ∝ wb know as Taylor’s power law [39]
as curiously observed in many natural systems). In this
conserved model the mean is not allowed to vary as it is
fixed by virtue of the model. It may be the case that σ2
then has to have a saturation. The limit of σ2 is tested
through an artificial situation where the association of
power law with large variance is tested in a reverse way.
Understanding the emergence of power law [7, 8] it-
self has been of great interest for decades. There is usu-
ally no accepted framework which may explain the origin
and wealth of varieties of its appearance. It is often ar-
gued that the dynamics which generate power laws is
dominated by multiplicative processes. It is true that
in an economy wealth (or money) of an agent multiplies
and that is coupled to the large number of interacting
agents. The generic stochastic Lotka-Volterra systems
like wi(t+1) = ǫwi(t)+aw(t)−bwi(t)w(t) have been stud-
ied [34, 40] to achieve power law distributions in wealth.
However, these kinds of models are not discussed in this
review as the basic intention had been to understand the
ideas behind models of conserved wealth which the above
is not.
In a twist of thinking, let us imagine a distribution
curve which can be stretched in any direction as one
wishes to have, keeping the area under this to be in-
variant. If now the curve is pulled too high around the
left then the right hand side is to fall off too quickly, ex-
ponential decay is a possible option then. On the other
hand, if the width of it is to be stretched too far (dis-
tribution becomes fat) at the right hand side, it should
then decay fairly slowly giving rise to a possible power
law fall at the right end while keeping the area under the
curve preserved. What makes such a stretching possible?
This review has been an attempt to integrate some ideas
regarding models of wealth distributions and to reinvent
things with a fresh outlook. In the way, some confu-
sions, conjectures and conclusions emerged where many
questions possibly have been answered with further ques-
tions and doubts. At the end of the day, the usefulness
of this (review) may be measured by further curiosities
and enhanced attention on the subject if at all this may
generate.
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